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ARTICLE
HOW “IS” BECAME “OUGHT”; OR, WHAT
DO BANKERS REALLY WANT?
CLAIRE A. HILL*
Economics famously holds that people are rational maximizers of their
self-interest. While nothing in economics requires self-interest to be maxi-
mized through zero-sum acquisition of money, the canonical formulations
typically assume that it is. The zero-sum aspect is critical. People want
(more) money, but money is a limited resource. If A is successful in his
pursuit of more money, B–Z will probably be getting less money. A mea-
sures his well-being based on what he can get—as much as possible. If his
pursuit of money increases the overall pot so that B–Z end up getting more,
that’s fine with A, but A will not incur costs to bring this about. Hence the
classic prediction as to how parties will behave in the “ultimatum game.”1
The first party is given some amount of money. He chooses how much to
give the second party, who can then accept or reject the first party’s offer. If
the first party’s offer is refused, neither party gets anything. The classic
prediction is that the first party will offer the second party as little as possi-
ble—one cent—and the second party will accept, since, after all, one cent is
more than zero.
The classic prediction has turned out to be colossally wrong. The first
party rarely offers a 99:1 split or anything even close to it, and the second
party rarely accepts an offer that gives the first party the vast bulk of the
amount to be shared.2 This is sometimes used as evidence that people are
not “rational.”3
* Claire A. Hill is a Professor and the James L. Krusemark Chair in Law at the University
of Minnesota Law School. The arguments made in this comment are developed further in a book
with Richard Painter on banker behavior to be published by University of Chicago Press in 2015.
1. See generally Elizabeth Hoffman, Kevin A. McCabe & Vernon L. Smith, On Expecta-
tions and the Monetary Stakes in Ultimatum Games, 25 INT’L J. OF GAME THEORY 289 (1996).
2. “On average, proposers offer about 40% of the pie to the second player. Moreover, offers
are rejected about 15-20% of the time. Perhaps not surprisingly, lower offers are more likely to be
rejected.” Jonathan Levin, Experimental Evidence, STANFORD.EDU, 2 (May 2006), http://www
.stanford.edu/~jdlevin/Econ%20286/Experimental.pdf.
3. See, e.g., Application of Fairness in the Ultimatum Game, PRINCETON.EDU, http://scenic
.princeton.edu/network20q/wiki/index.php?title=Application_of_fairness_in_the_Ultimatum_
Game (last modified Jan. 14, 2013).
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Economists originally characterized their view as to people’s rational-
ity, the rational person model, as descriptively accurate, or at least able, for
reasons of accuracy or for other reasons, to generate good predictions (pre-
sumably better predictions than available alternatives).4 When its descrip-
tive accuracy (or sufficient usefulness to make predictions) was
increasingly questioned, the economists’ claim became normative—“maybe
people are not rational, but they should be.”5 This latter move, from “is” to
“ought,” is what this comment seeks to highlight—and condemn. The con-
demnation is intended strongly but narrowly. As I noted above, nothing in
economics requires self-interest to be maximized through zero-sum acquisi-
tion of money. Economics has ample room to include dynamics that might
explain the results of the ultimatum game and other supposed anomalies,
such as evolutionary theory.6 For instance, people might give more than one
cent in the ultimatum game because evolution selects for those who abide
by norms of fairness. Even putting aside reasons why seemingly irrational
behavior might, given a broader perspective, serve traditionally conceived
narrow self-interest, recall that the original theory took no position on what
was in people’s self-interest. As Nobel Prize-winning economist Gary
Becker said in his 1992 prize lecture, “[t]he [economics] analysis assumes
that individuals maximize welfare as they conceive it, whether they be self-
ish, altruistic, loyal, spiteful, or masochistic.”7
Having narrowed my condemnation, let me return to it. Economics
has, perhaps to some extent unwittingly, given more credence and respecta-
bility than might otherwise have been given to both the descriptive and the
normative claims about “rationality”—that people are engaged in a  narrow
zero-sum pursuit of material wealth, and that they should be—that “greed is
good.” To overstate a bit, not being greedy is irrational. The result is that
this sort of “rational” behavior is encouraged; constraints, in the form of
societal condemnations (for, say, business practices that place a strong onus
on the buyer to beware) are muted.
4. See generally MILTON FRIEDMAN, The Methodology of Positive Economics, in ESSAYS IN
POSITIVE ECONOMICS 3 (1966).
5. See generally Claire A. Hill, The Rationality of Preference Construction (and the Irra-
tionality of Rational Choice), 9 MINN. J.L. SCI. & TECH. 689, 689–711 (2008).
6. See, e.g., Gary S. Becker, Altruism, Egoism, and Genetic Fitness: Economics and Sociol-
ogy, 14 J. OF ECON. LITERATURE 817 (1976). See also David G. Rand, Corina E. Tarnita, Hisashi
Ohtsuki & Martin A. Nowak, Evolution of Fairness in the One-Shot Anonymous Ultimatum
Game, 110 PROC. OF THE NAT’L ACAD. OF SCI. OF THE U.S. OF AM. 2581 (2013).
7. Gary S. Becker, The Economic Way of Looking at Life, in NOBEL LECTURES IN ECO-
NOMIC SCIENCES 1991–1995, 38 (Torsten Persson ed., World Scientific Publishing Co., 1997). In
a recent paper, economist Dani Rodrik seems to be suggesting that Becker has been too generous
to economists: “What the economist typically treats as immutable self-interest is too often an
artifact of ideas about who we are, how the world works, and what actions are available.” Dani
Rodrik, When Ideas Trump Interests: Preferences, Worldviews, and Policy Innovations, 28 J. OF
ECON. PERSP. 189, 206 (2014).
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What does any of this have to do with bankers? The ethos described
here helps explain why bankers behaved as they did in the years leading up
to the financial crisis. The ethos encouraged single-minded accumulation of
money, well beyond amounts needed for present and future material needs,8
and without (sufficient) regard to costs to third parties. Bankers were re-
warded, financially and otherwise, for creating and selling subprime securi-
ties and for pressuring rating agencies to rate many such securities AAA,
even when it was becoming increasingly clear that those securities were
probably “toxic.” Had bankers not been rewarded for this behavior, the
2008 financial crisis probably would not have happened. This is not to say
bankers caused the crisis. But rather their role was necessary and important.
While not all bankers behaved in problematic ways, enough did that it is
fair to see them as within the mainstream, not as outliers.
What form did the reward take? Most notoriously and saliently,
money, in the form of salary and more importantly, big bonuses contingent
on performance. Typically, the performance was good for the bank, at least
in the short term (although in some cases, it clearly was not, with Lehman
Brothers as exhibit A and Bear Stearns as exhibit B). But it certainly was
not good for the broader society. Besides money, there were other rewards
as well, including status and good professional prospects. And importantly,
even though in the canonical formulations money is pursued for what it can
buy—goods, services, leisure, and financial security in the future—the real-
ity is far more complex. Declining marginal utility of money should have
kicked in for the many bankers who already had much more money than
they could use, and were already in a position to retire and never work
again if they so chose: those bankers could already buy whatever they
wanted, and did not need more money to do so.9 Money also enabled bank-
ers to rank themselves favorably relative to their peers and their previous
selves.
Following economist Robert Frank, I would argue that many bankers
were afflicted with “Luxury Fever.”10 People are engaged in an arms race,
each trying to get better “stuff” than their peers, and valuing the stuff not
for its inherent qualities, but for its acknowledged or measurable superiority
over their peers’ stuff (bigger houses, for instance).11 Society too has had
luxury fever. The fever doesn’t just inspire competitive acquisitiveness. It
8. See e.g., Christopher K. Hsee, Jiao Zhang, Cindy F. Cai & Shirley Zhang, Overearning,
24 PSYCHOL. SCI. 852 (2013).
9. That being said, even extremely well-heeled bankers might want more money as a com-
petition emerges among them that increases the price of some of the goods and services they
might want, such as prime New York real estate. Robert Frank might say they only want the real
estate because it’s fancier than their neighbors’ real estate, but here I might disagree. See FRANK,
infra note 10.
10. See generally ROBERT H. FRANK, LUXURY FEVER: WHY MONEY FAILS TO SATISFY IN AN
ERA OF EXCESS (1999).
11. Id.
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also mutes the golden rule, a broader sense of community, and the associ-
ated other-regarding preferences, both in individuals and in the society
overall.
The “greed is good” ethos was a shift away from community-oriented
other-regarding societal norms, lessening if not eliminating the costs to
bankers of inflicting costs on third parties in their pursuit of riches.
What follows from this? Recall the real-world results of the ultimatum
game discussed above, as well as the Becker quote. What people want and
view as being in their self-interest is not necessarily and always zero-sum
acquisition of material wealth. We can’t know what people want, but we
can know that they are influenced by societal values. We know, too, that
these values are changeable. Speaking with precision about values at differ-
ent points in time is difficult, but a persuasive narrative suggests, and per-
haps linguistic search tools can provide some evidence, that following the
2008 crisis, values have shifted away from those reflected in the banker
ethos I have described. Not that highly lucrative careers (or huge quantities
of money) are out of fashion, but there may be more emphasis on doing
good or at least not doing bad. Some employers may be deciding that their
employees would prefer a better lifestyle to more money. Some evidence
and may are the operative words here. I can’t do more than speculate—
perhaps linguistic analysis would allow for more ambitious claims. But
these more ambitious claims are not necessary for my purposes. My claim
is narrow, but I think important—it is simply not accurate to claim as a
descriptive matter that what people want is necessarily as big a slice as they
can have of the material pie. Nor is it appropriate to claim that they should
want the biggest possible slice as a normative matter—that not wanting this
is somehow irrational. Claims that people simply are this way have been
common, certainly in the popular understanding and to some extent, albeit
mostly by implication, in academic literature. These claims have been per-
nicious, especially from a societal point of view. While other-regarding
preferences may not be an unambiguous good—great innovation that ends
up benefiting many people might be motivated solely by a person’s desire
for vast riches and glory—our society would surely have been far better off
if, in the years leading up to the 2008 financial crisis, more bankers had had
more such preferences.
